In the presence of foreign-owned factors of production in the economy, the effect of trade policy changes on national welfare needs to take into account the possible redistributive effect between foreign-owned and domestic factors. Therefore, an otherwise welfare-improving trade liberalization may paradoxically worse3 national welfare. This paper analyzes this important, new area of trade theory and establishes the condition under which this paradox of immiserizing trade liberalization arises. The analysis is also applicable to analyzing the effects of external tariff variation in customs unions, with full internal factor mobility, on member countries' welfare.
Introdnctioil
Hn the presence of foreign-owned factors of production in an economy, the traditional conclusions regarding the effects of exogenous parametl:ic changes or policy changes on national welfare need to be modified. Thus, in an open economy, the absence of the usual foreign and domestic distortions ii la Bhagwati (1971) and Johnson (1965) will not ensure that an exogenous term-of-trade improvement or a policy shift from autarky' to free trade will improve national welfare.
For example, take the traditional 2 x 2 moue1 of trade theory and assume that the importable good is labour-intensive, labour is wholly national, and capital is wholly foreign. A shift from autarky to free trade will then, by lowering the relative domestic price of the importable good, lower the real wage of labour ti la Stolper-Samuelson (1941) and thereby result in national *1 nanks are due to the National Science Foundation Grants Nos. SOC77-07188 and SOCi9-07541 for financial support of the research underlying thit paper. The comments of John Black, Alan Deardorff, Murray Kemp and Alasdair Smith have led to improvements.
'The term 'autarky' in the present context is taken to m:an the aisence of trade across national borders, in conformity with conventional terminology of economic policy discussior :'. More elaboration of this point is provided in section 4 belcw. jmmiserization from the shift to free trade. Free trade therefore worsens rather than improves welfare, given the presence of foreign capital in this example. Bhagwati and Tironi (1978) formulated the original plroblem as relevant to analyzing the widespread concerns of Latin American pohcymakers, who feared that regional trade liberalization would benefit foreign investors and could harm the Latin A..nerican nations themselves in consequence. In addressing this particular problem recently for the 2 x 2 model, the Bhagwati-Tironi analysis allows the tariff to vary by policy, but assumes that each of the two factors of production is wholly foreign or wholly national. This latter assumption permits them to adapt readily to their problem the well-known results on income distribution by factor class, originating from Stolper-Samuelson (1941) and developed in Bhagwati (1959) Johnson (1959 Johnson ( , 1960 and Rao (1971) .
Unfortunately, the real world does not permit us to divide all factors exclusively into the national or the foreign category. Capital flows to countries that cannot be assumed to have no capital of their own, and labour moves into countries tbat surely have native populations. Thus, it is necessary i"or this reason alone to examine the problem at hand by permitting the factors of production to be both national and foreign, as we do presently.
More importantl.y, while it is clear that a redistributive effect resulting from changing goods price-ratio could lead to paradoxical outcomes for national welfare, we are able to demonstrate a stronger proposition in this paper. Namely, the paradox of national immiserization following improvement in tne country% external terms of trade will arise if anl! only if the redistributive effect against nationals goes so far as to result in the dz~rential-trade-pattern phenomenon, as defined below. Our geometric analysis, moreover, has the added ad, antktge of using familiar trade-geometric techniques to simplify and resolve what appears to be a potentially complex problem. Furthermore, although the explicit focus of this paper is the national-foreign distinction, the two-group analysis presented here applies equally well to a broad !+ectrum of alternative domestic distinctions, e.g. those baseti tin race, ethnicity or sex.' Moreover, the analysis is just as readily applicable, as we demonstrate later, to the theory of customs u:iioi;s.
In section 2 we trace thz effects of variation in the goods price-ratio on the income accruing to national factors, thus defining their 'income lira at alternative prioe-ratios. In section 3, we relate this perfectly general 'analysis first to exogenolusly-induced changes in external terms of trade, assumirlg free 'ThiJs. our general-equilibrium analysis can throw light on the conditions ,,SB,de -which Paramcrric changes at the nationa: level may lead to conflicting outcomes for differentlyendt)wed racial, ethnic, sexual and other differentiated groups within the nation.
trade, and therewith discuss the effects on national welfare that would follow from such changes. We also relate the analysis next to effects of tariff variation on national welfare. Section 4 offers some concluding observations.
National income variations as goods price-ratio is varied
The first prcblem that we analyze relates to the behavior of the national 'income line' as the prevailing price-ratio for goods is varied.
The model has two factors of production, K (for capital) and L (for labour). The overall factor endowment is I? and e., while the national (i.e. domestically-owned) factor endowment is R, and L,. The two traded goods are X and Y With the usual restrictions on the linear homogeneous production functions for the two goods, and assuming the a%ence of factor-intensity reversals for the rest of our analysis, we can de&a an aggregate production possibility curve, T&T; in fig. 1 for the aggregate factor endowments (K, 1.). For the usual trade-theoretic analysis, with well-behaved social utility curves, a goods price-ratio AB will be defined for autarky and the utility index UG wr)uld rise monotonically as PJP,, (the relative price of X in terms of Y) was varied up from A to T: or down from A to T; (with reversed pattern of trade). (For simplicity of exposit;on, we assume that all income earned by factors from abroad is consumed locally, to avoid having to show re-patriation of such income k-r fig. I .) This relationship between 13,/P, and UG, as illustrated in fig. 2 , follows from deriving first the implication of the goods price-ratio variation for the aggregate budget line and then deducing the welfare level (UG) achieved in fig. 1 . For n~~iona2 welfare, however, we need to define these two steps for domestically-owned factors alone. First, as in this section, we must derive the national budget line, as defined by the domestic goods price-ratio. Next, as in the following section, we must deduce the national welfare level (v") reached in consequence. The natural way to proceed with the analysis then would appear to be to draw onto fig. 1 the national production possibility curve, T,T,, defined by the domestically-owned endowments I?, and E,. One may then be tempted to draw the goods price-ratio tangent to it, as to T:T;, and to treat the resulting income !:!ne as the national budget line.
But, except for a range of possible cases, this cannot be done. To see why, and to state the correct and complete analysis of the prob'lem, let us turn to the familiar Samuelson diagram in fig. 3 -which relates the goods price-ratio (P, ;P,x I1 the factorprice (rental-wage) ratio PK/PLl, and the sei;rcral capitai- capital intensive (as would be the case i; foreign capital alone had come into the country h la Bhagwati and Tironi (1978) ).
1
There are two cases that can arise then: either there is a range of factor price-ratios at which incomplete specialization will obtain on horh T,T, and TkTi or there is no such range. Fig. 3 illustrates the former, more interesting case; the latter, which corresponds incidentally to the Bhagwati-Tironi restrictive case, will be analyzed subsequently and related to the former.
The analysis then must distinguish among three zones of goods priceratios: Zone I, where they lead to incomplete speciahzatior in production for both the production possibility curves T,T, and TkT;; Zone II, where complete specialization on the capital-intensive good X occurs on TlTi. before it does on the national curve T,T,; and Zone 111, where complete specialization on the labour-intensive good Y occurs on T,T, before it occurs on the aggregate curve T:Tk. Take each, in turn.
--Zone I. For the aggregate endowment ratio, K/L, the range of factor priceratios for incomplete specialization is clearly CE (i.e. OC to OE) on the vertical axis of fig. 3 . For the nati;nal endowment ratio, R,/E,, the range foi' incomplete specialization is DF. I herefore, DE represents along the verticai axis the range of factor prices over which both T,T, and TkT;. will show incomplete specialization. Consequently, for any goods price-ratio in the range DE (i.e. OD to OE) along the left-hand horizontal axis, it is evident that the choice of capital-labour ratios in X and Y will be identicrrl for T,T, and for T:T6, and hence there will be a unique set of real factor prices (P,jP, *and PJP,. i=x, J) along both of these production possibility curves.3 Given this uniqueness, ?he value of national income (LmPJPi+Rn.PK'Pir i =x, y) can be represented by the goods price-ratio tangent 'to TxT,, for the same rerason that the value of aggregate income (LP,/Pj +RPJPi, i=x, y) is representable by the goods price-ratio tangent to T:Ti. Thus, even though T,T, is only a hypothetical construct and national factors combine with foreign factors to produce at common techniques tbroughout the economy along T:T;, we can see immediately that the foregoing procedure for deriving the national budget line (by putting the goods price-ratio tangent to T,TJ will be valid as long as P,/P, is in the range DE. (Capitalintensive 1 3For ease of identification, fig. 3 is marked, both for P,/PL and for P,,/Px, with identical lettering: C, D, E, and F. Thus, the factor price-ratio range DE ::orresponds to the goods pricera:io range DE. Similarly, the poslioning of the letters C, W, E and F on the KJL, and K,/L, schedules indicates, as noted in the text, corresponding points of specialization in production on T,q and T;T$ Again, the lettering on T,T, and T:T; in fig. 4 will correspond to the lettering in fig. 3 , to facilitate grasp of the relationship between the two illustrations.
Good Y t tone III
Therefore, for this overlapping range (DE) of incomplete specialization, we can indeed proceed in fig. 4 to place the goods price-ratio tangent to TXTJ to derive the national income line. Resildes, a movement from E to D along T,T, and T:T; will imply -given the resulting rise in the wage-rental ratio and the condition .&/z, <B/L -'a rise in the share of aggregate income going to domestically-owned factors.
Zone II. But vary now the goods price-ratio P,,,'P, down from OE in fig. 3 . It is evident that there will be complete speci.alization on good X on T:TI, while, on T,T,, we would get incomplete E;pecialization in production until the goods price-ratio becomes OF ( fig. 3 ). Since the returns to domesticallyowned factors must reflect what happens on TiT;, however, it follows that the relative rewards of K and E will remain fixed at P,/P,= OE in fig. 3 for all changes in the goods price-ratio ,from OE to OF anal further.
Therefore, the share of national in aggregate income will also remain constant, for such variations in the goods price-ratio, at OQ/OE. The irational income line therefore will become EQ in fig. 4 for the goods pricemtio OE in fig. 3 and will shift on its anchor Q thereafter to QS through QR as P,/P, falls steadily from OE to zero in lig. 3.
Clearly, therefore, the stretch EF on T,T, is not relevant to the determination of the national income line. The diminishing wage-rental ratio that it reflects as K,'L ratios change with a varying goods price-ratio are, in fact.. arrested because of the opportunity to combine with the foreign Factors. The gain that such an opportunity represents for national factors is measured by the distance between: (1) the income line produced by tangency of a goods price-ratio along EF in fig. 4 ; and (2) the parallel income line (anchored on Q) that actually obtains, thanks to interaction with the foreign factors and the consequent anchoring of the techniques and factor rewards at E on TLTI,.
Zone 111. Varying the goods price-ratio in the opposite direction, from OD upwards toward OC and beyond in fig. 3 , &en defines the remaining set of possible variations in the goods price-ratio.
At goods price-ratio OD, T,'T;, shows specialization on good Y and T_kT;. shows incomplete specialization, in fig. 4 . It' factor prices were constant as PJP, rises, T,T, would have led to continuous improvement in the national budget line, each successive budget line being anchored on D and rotating upwards. Howeve,r, PK/P, is not fixed, bl;t will continue to fall as the aggregate economy moves along T:Ti, from D to C. Therefore, given the associated increase in the wage-rental ratir_ and the condition R,.,/Z, <R/J% the share of national in aggregate income will rise with the move from D towards C on T:T;. However, the move to C from D is aiso accompani:d by a declining intercept of the aggregate income line with the vertical axis. Therefore, while the former effect works to raise the national income line, the latter effect works to lower it.
It ii; possible to establish, however, that the combination of these two effects yields an unambiguously upward shift in the national income line, according to the following reasoning. The real value of national income in terms of good Y is given by & =&,PL/Py +R,P,/P,,. By differentiation of this equation, d&,/d (PJP,,) = [LJK, + d(P,IP,)/d(P,/P~)jE,.
Since the firstorder conditions for profit maximization can be manipulated easily to show
because L,/K, 2&,/K, within zone III, with the strict equality holding only for the borderline case of goods price-ratio OD. Consequently, as PJP, increases continuously with Py/PX (C; la StolperSamuelson) within zone III, Q,, rises correspondingly, and hence the national income line shifts upwards while becoming flatter.4 Once the goods priceratio reaches QC in fig. 4 , however, and specialization on good Y ensues at Tk for the aggregate economy, successive increases in P,,/P, will not change the share of national in aggregate income and the national income line will rotate upwards (along with P,,/P,) from a fixed anchor on the vertical axis in ffs. 4.
What happens in the goods pricp ,-ratio range from OD to OC is that the presence of foreign factors introduces diminishing wage-rental ratios, which would have been avoided if national factors had operated in isolation (at D in fig. 4 ). At the same time, d la Stolper-Samuelson, an 'incomeredistribution' phenomenon works to labour's and hence to national advantage. Apparently, howrIer, the net impact on the national income line is unambiguously favourable in the general case for thf: subrange of goods-price ratios ODSP,/P,S;OC.
For price-ratios in the subrange Py/Px> OC, there is, of course, only a favourabie rotation of the national income line as P,/P, improves alnd the economy is specialized on good X These two subranges together define all the possibilities in zone III.
In concluding this section, note that the T,T, curve clearly would be of little use if E,/z,, were so much below If/L that zone I did not exist.5 In this case, we can slee immediately that the situation can be described fully by the 40f course, dQ,/d(P,/P,)gO also because L,/K, zL,/K,. Except for the borderline case of goods price-ratio OD, it is evident that LJK, exceeds both L,fK, and L,/K,, as P,lP, varies from D 10 C and therefore both Qy and Q, will improve unambiguously with increase of P,,/P,.
'If as in the Bhagwati-Tironi analysis, there is or,ly labour in the national endowmeE:.t, aniv cap& is essential for production, T,T, would shlink to the origin! Otherwiz, in their model, it would hive a Ricardian shape if capital is dispensable.
foregoing analysis of zones II and III. Of course, it is clear that this case, where there is no zone I, is implied by the Bhagwati-Tironi analysis where capital is wholly foreign and labour is wholly domestic. For, in this case, where the Stolper-Samuelson-Bhagwati-Johnson-Rao analysis can be ap---plied directly, the overall factor endowment ratio is K!L, and the national endowment ratio is R,/E, =O. Indeed, in this case, it is evident that the national income in units of Y (Q,) and of X (Q,) will unambiguously rise as the real wage of labour rises in terms of both Yand X with the rise of PJP,, 2 la Stolper-Samuelson.
Welfare implications in an open economy
The preceding analysis can be readily grafted onto two familiar problems of ihe theory of trade and welfare: (1) the welfare effects of exogenouslyind.:tced changes in the external terms of trade (as a result of some type of par'imetric shift abroad) under free trade, and (2) the welfare comparison of free trade and autarky. The critical role of the differential-trade-yattern phenomenon emerges from our analysis. The discussion holds equally well for both the large-country and small-country cases, even though the magnitude of adjustment in the equilibrium value of international prices could depend upon the economy's degree of monopoly power in world trade.
Exogenously-induced changes in the terms of trade
As noted above, in the context of fig. 2 , the conventional result, with a standard social utility function, is that improvements in the terms of trade monothonically improve welfare under free trade, given the pattern of trade. This result, however, daes not hold necessarily in the presence of foreign factors of production. To see this, consider terms of trade variations within the three zones distinguished in section 2 for the general case where zone I also obtains. The analysis can be readily extended by the reader to terms of trade changes between the Zones. 3.1.1. Changes within zone I. Within zone I, the domestic price-ratio (which is identical to the external terms of trade under f;ee trade) can be put tangent to T,T, to derive the national income line, as shown above in section 2. It follows therefore that terms-of-trad; improvement within zone I ougnt to increase national welfare.
It should be observed, however, that 2 given change in P,jP, may mean both an improvement in the terms of trade for the economy as an aggregate and a sinAtaneous terms-of-trade deterioration from the national point of view. This apparent paradox is easily see,n and quickly resolved, by noting simply that the equilibrium value of P,/P, may differ between aggregate autarky (along the actual production possibility curve T:T$ and national autarky (along the hypothetical curve TCT,), so that the aggregate (actual) pattern of trade may differ from the natronal (hypothetical) pattern of trade. For this reason, although natfonal welfare improves monotonically with the national terms of trade, aggregate terms-of-trade improvement will not imply an increase in national welfare unless the aggregate and national patterns of trade happen to be the same. This is illustrated in fig. 5 , where the T>TI curve has been omitt'ed, to avoid cluttering the diagram. The aggregate-aurarky price-ratio (determined along the omitted curve TkTL) is drawn tangent to TX??,, at .4'. The nationalautarky price-ratio is tangent to TXTY at A. (To have ray OA' steeper than ray OA as drawn, a sufficient but not necessary condition is a unique set of homothetic indifference curves corresponding to both UG and UN, in view of
the well-known Rybczymki Theorem) For any reductions in P,/P, from A', Uo would have improved. Howeve:, for all such changes between A' and A, within the autarkic price-ratios cone AOA', U" obviously declines because for national factors the aggregate terms-of-trade improvement is a terms-r,ftrade deterioration. Therefore, U" declines steadily from Uz, through U'y to U:, However, further declines in PJP, will start improving U" and fig. 5 shows the PJPx at G which raises U" back lo the level A' *consistent with the aggregate-autarky price-ratio. Obviously, then, still further decline in PJP, would have raised U" above the level at A'.
It follows that the net result of terms-of-trade improvements for the aggregate economy may be to raise, lower or leave national welfare unchanged. This general result still would hold if ray OA' were flatter than ray OA. Only if the two rays coincided would aggregate terms-of-trade improvement necessarily imply an increase in national welfare. We have thus shown that, in zone I, the paradox of conflicti:>g movements in aggregate and national welfare will arise when there is a difference between the national and aggregate patterns-of-trade. This dqjk ,ential-trade-patte~r? phenomenon will now be discussed in the context of the other two zones.
3.1.2. Changes within zone II. Within zone II, there is (aggregate) specialization on good X along T:T; in fig. 4 . It is evident then that any improvements in the aggregate terms of trade will in ply corresponding improvements in the national terms of trade since both the nation&i and aggregate patterns trade will necessarily involve excess supply of good X. Successive rotation:; outwards of the national income line, anchored on (2, will produce increasing national welfare, U". Therefore, changes in UG may be used to infer the direction of change of U'; there is no complication as in zone I, since the d~~~~ential-trade-pattern phenomenon cannot arise here.
Changes within zone III.
Within zone III, however, the possibility of diflerential-trade-pattern phenomenon re-emerges. In the aggregate, there is first the range of incomplete specialization (up to C from D on TkTi, in fig. 4 ) and then complete specialization on good Y. For variations in the aggrtgate terms of trade within the incomplete-specialization range, our earlier analysis shows that the national income line must rise with P,/P,. By the same token, U" must also rise with PJP,. Thus, when P,/P, rises, U" and UG bill move together or in opposite directions according as the economy (in aggregate) exports good Y or X respectively.
However, beyond the point of specialization on good Y the aggregate terms-of-trade improvement (resulting from a rise in P,./P,) must also increase national income and therefore CT". The net effect of terms-of-trade improvements in zone III therefore may be to lower or increase national welfare when there is incomplete specialization along T:T;, but must be to raise national welfare when aggregate specialization is complete on good Y Note, moreover. that the contrary behaviour of U" and UC', possible in the case of incomplete specialization, does require that the aggregate pattern of trade be different from the national pattern of trade: for, such a possibility will arise if and only if the aggregate trade pattern involves the export of good X6 and the national trade pattern (owing to complete specialization on good x necessarily in zone III) involves the export of good Yinstead.
It is evident therefore that directional changes in national welfare generalty cannot be inferred i'rom the direction of changes in the terms of trade in the aggregate, if the economy is in zones I and III. Interestingly, for both these zones, the paradoxical behaviour of national welfare arises simply because the aggregate pattern of trade masks a contrary pattern of trade for the domestically-owned. national factors of production. If only we could draw aside the veil imposed by the presence of foreign factors, and see directly the national (hypothetical) equilibrium production and consumption, the paradox would have disappez red.7 Therefore, we may describe the paradox of zones I and III as arising thorn the di~rential-trade-pattern phenomenon. The redistribution of income Z la Stolper-Samuelson does indeed take place in both zones I and JII; b!,t it might not be sufficiently strong to create the paradox of deterifjration (improvement) in national welfare when the economy's terms of trade improve (deteriorate). Sufficient strength, moreover, is here synonymous with a difference between the national and aggregate patterns Ltf trade.
Autarky uersm free trade
Since neither free trade nor autarky creates tariff revenue, the analysis of this paper can be readily used also to ran k these two trade policies in the presence of foreign-owned factors of production.
It is seen immediately that, in zones I and III, the differential-trade-pattern phenomenon may arise and thus lead to autarky (in the aggregate) being better for national welfare than free trade. (Zone II can be ignored at this stage in the discuss&_, since aggregate autarky cannot occur when oniy '?his is, in fact, the paradoxical case considered ,in Bhagwati and Tironi (1978, section II) , but without the underlying explanation and argumentation G la the national production possibility curve, as set out in this paper.
'Of course, this does not mean that the paradox cannot arise if national and foreign tastes are homothetic. For, it is the difference in the trade i;attern, as determined by the production and consumption chotces at the specified goods price-ratio, that is the critical variable in creating the paradox in both zones. Mor should the reader forget that the hypothetical national equilibrium production will reflect, in zone III (as also zone II, fx that matter), the interaction with foreign factors: the national inc,>me line cannot simply be #drawn by reference to T,7;. alone by tangency of the goods price-ratio with it. In zone I, however, the presence of foreign factors does nothing to affect the correctnesc of such a procedure. good X is produced along TLT;, assuming that aggregate consumption is always positive for each good.) Thus, the conventional welfare ranking (of free trade being superior to autarky) may be reversed, in the presence of foreign-owned factors of production within an economy.
Concluding remark
In conclusion, a few words should be said about the meaning of the term 'autarky,' as used by us in this paper. By general convention in practical parlance, autarky refers to the absence of trade across national borders. At the same time, evidently 'autarky' does not exclude domestic 'trade' between resident citizens of different countries. The national and foreign, factors in our analysis are indeed engaged in domestic trade', even in the absence of international (i.e. trans-border) trade, The analytical problem is therefore identical to that which would arise in the case of customs unions. For, once a customs union is for.med with common external tariff and free internal trade and factor mobility, changes in individual member countries' welfare as external conditions change for the union as a whole are evidently analyzable in precisely the same fashion as changes in national welfare in the presence of foreign factors of production! sThis intra-national trade might be either goods for goods (in zone I where trade in factor services is not necessary to equalize marginal products) or goods for factor services (in zones II and III where marginal products would otherwise remain unequal).
